



Multi-moduli NTTs for Saber on Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M4

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Organization of This Talk

Introduction

Time–Memory Tradeoffs

Polynomial Multiplications on Cortex-M4

MatrixVectorMul

First–Order Masked MatrixVectorMul and InnerProd

Saber on Cortex-M3

Results

Introduction

Saber

- $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_{8192}[x]/\langle x^{256} + 1 \rangle$
- Parameters (l, μ) varies from security levels (other parameters omitted in this talk).
 - LightSaber : $(l, \mu) = (2, 10)$
 - Saber : $(l, \mu) = (3, 8)$
 - FireSaber : $(l, \mu) = (4, 6)$
- $A \in R_q^{l \times l}, s, s' \in R_q^l$.
 - Key generation: $A^T s$
 - Encryption: As'

NTT-Based MatrixVectorMul for Saber

- Find an NTT-friendly modulus q' such that $A^T s$ in \mathbb{Z} is the same as in $\mathbb{Z}_{q'}$
 - NTT-friendly: next slide
 - Signed arithmetic: choose $q' > 2 \cdot \frac{8192}{2} \cdot \frac{\mu}{2} \cdot l$
- Compute $A^T s = \text{NTT}^{-1} (\text{NTT}(A^T) \cdot \text{NTT}(s))$
 - $\ell + l$ NTTs
 - l NTT^{-1} s
 - ℓ base multiplications

Number-Theoretic Transforms i

- Ring R , invertible $\zeta \in R$
- $n \perp \text{char}(R)$, principal n -th root of unity ω_n ($\forall 1 \leq i < n, \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \omega_n^{ij} = 0$). Equivalently, for $R = \mathbb{Z}_q$ with prime factorization $q = \prod_{i=0}^{l-1} p_i^{d_i}$, $n|\mathbf{0}(q) := \gcd(p_i - 1)_{0 \leq i < l}$ [AB74].
- $R[x]/\langle x^n - \zeta^n \rangle \cong \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} R[x]/\langle x - \zeta \omega_n^i \rangle : \mathbf{a}(x) \mapsto \mathbf{a}(\zeta \omega_n^i)_i$
- Cooley–Tukey FFT:

$$\begin{aligned} R[x]/\langle x^{n_0 n_1} - \zeta^{n_0 n_1} \rangle &\cong \prod_{i_0=0}^{n_0-1} R[x]/\langle x^{n_1} - \zeta^{n_1} \omega_n^{i_0 n_1} \rangle \\ &\cong \prod_{i_0=0}^{n_0-1} \prod_{i_1=0}^{n_1-1} R[x]/\langle x - \zeta \omega_n^{i_0 + i_1 n_0} \rangle \end{aligned}$$

Number-Theoretic Transforms ii

$$\begin{aligned} R[x] \left/ \left\langle x^{2^k} - \zeta^{2^k} \right\rangle \right. &\cong \prod_{i_0=0}^1 R[x] \left/ \left\langle x^{2^{k-1}} - \zeta^{2^{k-1}} \omega_2^{i_0} \right\rangle \right. \\ &\cong \prod_{i_0, i_1=0}^1 R[x] \left/ \left\langle x^{2^{k-2}} - \zeta^{2^{k-2}} \omega_4^{i_0+2i_1} \right\rangle \right. \\ &\cong \prod_{i_0, \dots, i_{k-1}=0}^1 R[x] \left/ \left\langle x - \zeta \omega_{2^k}^{\sum_{j=0}^{k-1} 2^j i_j} \right\rangle \right. \end{aligned}$$

- k isomorphisms of product rings
- Each isomorphism takes $O(2^k)$ time $\implies O(k2^k)$ time (or $O(n \lg n)$ where $n = 2^k$)


Number-Theoretic Transforms iii

- $R = \mathbb{Z}_{q_0 q_1}, R_0 = \mathbb{Z}_{q_0}, R_1 = \mathbb{Z}_{q_1}, q_0 \perp q_1$
- $(\zeta_0, \zeta_1) = (\zeta \bmod q_0, \zeta \bmod q_1), (\omega_{0:n}, \omega_{1:n}) = (\omega_n \bmod q_0, \omega_n \bmod q_1)$
- NTT := $\mathbf{a}(x) \mapsto \mathbf{a}(\zeta \omega_n^i)_i$, $\text{NTT}_0 := \mathbf{a}(x) \mapsto \mathbf{a}(\zeta_0 \omega_{0:n}^{i_0})_{i_0}$, $\text{NTT}_1 := \mathbf{a}(x) \mapsto \mathbf{a}(\zeta_1 \omega_{1:n}^{i_1})_{i_1}$

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \frac{R[x]}{\langle x^n - \zeta^n \rangle} & \xrightarrow{\text{NTT}} & \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{R[x]}{\langle x - \zeta \omega_n^i \rangle} \\ \text{mod} \downarrow & & \uparrow \text{CRT} \\ \frac{R_0[x]}{\langle x^n - \zeta_0^n \rangle} \times \frac{R_1[x]}{\langle x^n - \zeta_1^n \rangle} & \xrightarrow{\text{NTT}_0 \times \text{NTT}_1} & \prod_{i_0=0}^{n-1} \frac{R_0[x]}{\langle x - \zeta_0 \omega_{0:n}^{i_0} \rangle} \times \prod_{i_1=0}^{n-1} \frac{R_1[x]}{\langle x - \zeta_1 \omega_{1:n}^{i_1} \rangle} \end{array}$$

Number-Theoretic Transforms iv

What we will do next.



Time–Memory Tradeoffs

Memory for Polynomials

Assumptions:

- Secret polynomials are stored in their 4-bit form.
- Public polynomials are stored in their 16-bit form.
- Public polynomials are only used once. Memory can be re-used.
- Expand to 32-bit when needed.

Stack usage:

- Memory for buffers.
- Memory for public polynomials.
- We ignore the memory for secret polynomials.


Stack Usage of 32-bit NTT-Based Polynomial Multiplications

- Each line segment = 4096 bits, 16384 bits in total.
- A size-256 poly. of 32-bit coeffs. is stored in two segments.
- Compute $\mathbf{a}(x)\mathbf{b}(x) = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT}(\mathbf{a}(x)) \cdot \text{NTT}(\mathbf{b}(x)))$
- Expand $\mathbf{a}(x), \mathbf{b}(x)$ to 32-bit first




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
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
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$\text{NTT}(\mathbf{a}(x)) \cdot \text{NTT}(\mathbf{b}(x))$

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
Stack Usage of 16-bit NTT-Based Polynomial Multiplications

- Each line segment = 4096 bits, 12288 bits in total.
- A size-256 poly. of 16-bit coeffs. is stored in a segment.

- Compute

$$\mathbf{a}(x)\mathbf{b}(x) = \text{CRT}(\text{NTT}_0^{-1}(\text{NTT}_0(\mathbf{a}(x)) \cdot \text{NTT}_0(\mathbf{b}(x))), \text{NTT}_1^{-1}(\text{NTT}_1(\mathbf{a}(x)) \cdot \text{NTT}_1(\mathbf{b}(x))))$$

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


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


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


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


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


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


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
$\mathbf{a}(x)\mathbf{b}(x) \bmod q_0q_1$

Our approach


For a Cortex-M4, one 32-bit NTT is much faster than two 16-bit NTTs.

1. Start with 16-bit NTTs
2. Identify at which point that inevitably, corresponding elements in $\mathbb{Z}_{q_0}, \mathbb{Z}_{q_1}$ are *both* in memory
3. Replace operations in $\mathbb{Z}_{q_0}, \mathbb{Z}_{q_1}$ with $\mathbb{Z}_{q_0 q_1}$ for these elements


Combining 32-bit NTTs and 16-bit NTTs




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
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
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
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Combining 32-bit NTTs and 16-bit NTTs




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
$$\overline{\text{NTT}_0(\mathbf{a}(x)) \cdot \text{NTT}_0(\mathbf{b}(x))} \quad \overline{\text{NTT}_1(\mathbf{a}(x)) \cdot \text{NTT}_1(\mathbf{b}(x))}$$

Combining 32-bit NTTs and 16-bit NTTs



NTT($\mathbf{a}(x)$) · NTT($\mathbf{b}(x)$)

Combining 32-bit NTTs and 16-bit NTTs



$$\mathbf{a}(x)\mathbf{b}(x) \bmod q_0q_1$$

Performance of NTT-Based Polynomial Multiplications on Cortex-M4

Table 1: NTT-related functions on Cortex-M4. Numbers of the last two columns are extracted from paper.

	32-bit	16-bit + 16-bit	32-bit	16-bit
NTT	5 853	4 374 + 4 822	5853	4822
NTT^{-1}	7 137	–	7137	4817
base_mul	–	3731 + 2 965	4186	2965
$\text{mod } p_i$	–	0 + 1 171	–	–
CRT	–	2 435	–	2 435
poly_mul		32 488	23 029	37 287

Strategies for MatrixVectorMul

- Strategy A: $A^T s = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT}(A^T) \cdot \underline{\text{NTT}(s)})$
- Strategy B: $A_{i,j}^T s_j = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT}(A_{i,j}^T) \cdot \underline{\text{NTT}(s_j)})$
- Strategy C: $A^T s = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\underline{\text{NTT}(A^T)} \cdot \text{NTT}(s))$
- Strategy D: $A_{i,j}^T s_j = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\underline{\text{NTT}(A_{i,j}^T)} \cdot \text{NTT}(s_j))$

Figure 1: Strategies for MatrixVectorMul.

	Cache NTT(s)	Compute NTT(s)
Acc. in NTT domain	A	C
Acc. in $\mathbb{Z}_{8192}[x]$	B	D

- Key generation, $A^T s$: strategies A, B, D

- Encryption, $A s'$: strategies A, C, D

First–Order Masked MatrixVectorMul and InnerProd

First-Order Masked MatrixVectorMul and InnerProd

- Split $s' = s'_0 + s'_1$ (first-order)
- Compute (As'_0, As'_1)
- $(As'_0, As'_1) = (\text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT}(A) \cdot \text{NTT}(s'_0)), \text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT}(A) \cdot \text{NTT}(s'_1)))$
 - $\ell + 2/\text{NTTs}$
 - $2/\text{NTT}^{-1}s$
- Coefficient rings of s'_0, s'_1 : \mathbb{Z}_{8192} instead of $\left\{-\frac{\mu}{2}, \dots, \frac{\mu}{2}\right\}$
 - Compute with one 32-bit NTT and one 16-bit NTT
- In total:
 - $\ell + 2/32\text{-bit NTTs}$
 - $\ell + 2/16\text{-bit NTTs}$
 - $2/32\text{-bit NTT}^{-1}s$
 - $2/16\text{-bit NTT}^{-1}s$

Saber on Cortex-M3

Differences Between Cortex-M3 and Cortex-M4

- No floating-point registers
- No DSP extension ($s\{mul, mla\}\{b, t\}\{b, t\}$, $smlad\{, x\}$, $\{u, s\}\{add, sub\}\{8, 16\}$)
 - 16-bit NTTs are much slower
- $\{u, s\}\{mul, mla\}l$ takes input-dependent cycles
 - NTT_leak: 32-bit NTTs are variable time (for public data)
 - Constant-time NTTs: Emulate 32-bit NTTs with `mul`, `mla`, ... [GKS21] (much slower)
- Question: which is better?
 - Cortex-M4: one 32-bit NTT is faster than two 16-bit NTTs
 - Cortex-M3: two 16-bit NTTs vs one 32-bit NTT

Saber on Cortex-M3 i

- 16-bit NTTs only
 - $As' = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT}(A) \cdot \text{NTT}(s'))$ where $\text{NTT}/\text{NTT}^{-1}$ is a pair of 16-bit NTT/iNTTs
- 32-bit NTTs only
 - $As' = \text{NTT}^{-1}(\text{NTT_leak}(A) \cdot \text{NTT}(s'))$ where NTT is the constant-time NTT.
- 32-bit NTTs and 16-bit NTT
 - $As' = \text{NTT}^{-1}((a \mapsto (a \bmod q_0, a \bmod q_1) \circ \text{NTT_leak})(A) \cdot \text{NTT}(s'))$ where $\text{NTT}/\text{NTT}^{-1}$ is a pair of 16-bit NTT/iNTTs
 - Doesn't worth it as $a \mapsto (a \bmod q_0, a \bmod q_1) \approx \text{NTT} - \text{NTT_leak}$

Saber on Cortex-M3 ii

Table 2: NTT-related functions on Cortex-M3.

	2 × 16-bit	32-bit
NTT	16 774	31 056
NTT_leak	—	19 363
NTT ⁻¹	19 079	37 394
base_mul	11 933	8 532
mod p_i	—	—
CRT	4 642	—
poly_mul	69 202	96 345

Results

Cortex-M4 Results i

Table 3: Unprotected Saber on Cortex-M4.

		LightSaber		Saber		FireSaber		
		cc	stack	cc	stack	cc	stack	
M4	[MKV20] (stack)	K	612k	3 564	1 230k	4 348	2 046k	5 116
		E	880k	3 148	1 616k	3 412	2 538k	3 668
		D	976k	3 164	1 759k	3 420	2 740k	3 684
	[CHK ⁺ 21] (speed)	K	360k	14 604	658k	23 284	1 008k	37 116
		E	513k	16 252	864k	32 620	1 255k	40 484
		D	498k	16 996	835k	33 824	1 227k	41 964
	This work 32-bit (speed, A)	K	353k	5 764	644k	6 788	990k	7 812
		E	487k	6 444	826k	7 468	1 208k	8 484
		D	456k	6 440	777k	7 484	1 152k	8 500
	This work hybrid (stack, D)	K	423k	3 428	819k	3 940	1 315k	4 452
		E	597k	3 204	1 063k	3 332	1 617k	3 468
		D	583k	3 220	1 039k	3 348	1 594k	3 484

Cortex-M4 Results ii

Table 4: Masked Saber ($l = 3$) on the Cortex-M4.

	Decapsulation	
	cc	stack
[VBDK ⁺ 20]	2833k	11 656
This work (speed, A)	2 385k	16 140
This work (C)	2615k	10 476
This work (stack, D)	2846k	8 432

Table 5: Masking cycles/stack overhead.

	unmasked A		unmasked D	
	cc	stack	cc	stack
masked A	3.07	2.16	2.30	4.82
masked C	3.37	1.40	2.52	3.13
masked D	3.66	1.13	2.74	2.52

Cortex-M3 Results

Table 6: Unprotected Saber on Cortex-M3.

			LightSaber		Saber		FireSaber	
			cc	stack	cc	stack	cc	stack
M3	pqm3	K	710k	9 652	1 328k	13 252	2 171k	20 116
	Toom	E	967k	11 372	1 738k	15 516	2 688k	22 964
	(speed)	D	1 081k	12 116	1 902k	16 612	2 933k	24 444
	This work	K	540k	5 756	939k	6 788	1 439k	7 812
	16-bit	E	715k	6 436	1 194k	7 468	1 751k	8 492
	(speed, A)	D	749k	6 436	1 237k	7 468	1 811k	8 492
	This work	K	632k	3 420	1 253k	3 932	1 955k	4 444
	16-bit	E	887k	3 204	1 614k	3 332	2 427k	3 460
	(stack, D)	D	923k	3 204	1 657k	3 332	2 487k	3 460
	This work	K	594k	5 732	1 057k	6 756	1 553k	7 788
	32-bit	E	800k	6 412	1 330k	7 444	1 883k	8 468
	(speed, A)	D	877k	6 420	1 429k	7 452	2 016k	8 476

Summary

- Cortex-M4:
 - Cycles: NTT (speed) << NTT (stack) \approx non-NTT (speed: TMVP, Toom–Cook) << non-NTT (stack: Karatsuba)
 - Stack: NTT (stack) \approx non-NTT (stack) < non-NTT (speed) < NTT (speed)
- Cortex-M3:
 - Cycles: 16-bit NTT (speed) < 32-bit NTT (speed) < 16-bit NTT (stack) < non-NTT (speed, Toom–Cook)
 - Stack: 16-bit NTT (stack) < 32-bit NTT (speed) \approx 16-bit NTT (speed) < non-NTT (speed, Toom–Cook)



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